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大陆成人直播
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微观经济学workshop: Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition
发布日期：2018-12-06 02:43 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年12月06日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：李建培
题目：Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition
摘要: In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre--employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade--offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings. 主讲人信息: 李建培，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院教授。主要研究领域为应用微观经济学，包括契约理论和产业组织理论。研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Theory，International Journal of Industrial Organization等经济学国际期刊。曾主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、霍英东教育基金会项目、教育部新世纪优秀人才支持项目。荣获2018年中国信息经济学会乌家培奖。 If you want to be reminded each time before our workshop, please send an email to: [email protected]。
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-
大陆成人直播
-
微观经济学workshop: Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition
发布日期：2018-12-06 02:43 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年12月06日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：致福轩会议室
主讲人：李建培
题目：Signaling versus Costly Information Acquisition
摘要: In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre--employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade--offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings. 主讲人信息: 李建培，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院教授。主要研究领域为应用微观经济学，包括契约理论和产业组织理论。研究成果发表于RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Theory，International Journal of Industrial Organization等经济学国际期刊。曾主持国家自然科学基金青年项目、霍英东教育基金会项目、教育部新世纪优秀人才支持项目。荣获2018年中国信息经济学会乌家培奖。 If you want to be reminded each time before our workshop, please send an email to: [email protected]。
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