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微观经济学workshop:Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice
发布日期：2017-10-26 10:50 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2017年10月26日（周四）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学艺园三楼会议室
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
主讲人：张永超（上海财经大学经济学院）
题目：Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice
(coauthored with Qianfeng Tang )
摘要：We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching-one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice problems and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students'assignments. A matching is said to be self-constrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any matching more stable than it. We prove that the following statements are equivalent for a matching: (i) it is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient; (ii) it is exactly the outcome of the generalized Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism which uses its own set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint; and (iii) it weakly Pareto dominates every matching which is more stable than it.
主讲人简介：张永超博士(2011,新加坡国立大学)，现为上海财经大学经院学院副教授。主要研究领域为微观经济理论，博弈论，成果曾发表于Journal of Economic Theory， Theoretical Economics，Advances in Mathematics等期刊。
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大陆成人直播
-
微观经济学workshop:Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice
发布日期：2017-10-26 10:50 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2017年10月26日（周四）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学艺园三楼会议室
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
主讲人：张永超（上海财经大学经济学院）
题目：Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice
(coauthored with Qianfeng Tang )
摘要：We propose a new notion of weak stability for two-sided matching problems. A matching is said to be weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching-one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. We then apply this concept to school choice problems and study its compatibility with the Pareto efficiency of students'assignments. A matching is said to be self-constrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any matching more stable than it. We prove that the following statements are equivalent for a matching: (i) it is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient; (ii) it is exactly the outcome of the generalized Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism which uses its own set of blocking pairs as the consenting constraint; and (iii) it weakly Pareto dominates every matching which is more stable than it.
主讲人简介：张永超博士(2011,新加坡国立大学)，现为上海财经大学经院学院副教授。主要研究领域为微观经济理论，博弈论，成果曾发表于Journal of Economic Theory， Theoretical Economics，Advances in Mathematics等期刊。
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