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微观workshop:Extorting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore’s Unlicensed Money Lending Market
发布日期：2017-12-29 10:17 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2017年12月29日（周五）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学致福轩大教室
主讲人：徐海波 （复旦大学助教授）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Extorting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore’s Unlicensed Money Lending Market
(coauthored with Kaiwen Leong and Huailu Li )摘要：Using a unique dataset that tracked the borrowing behavior of over a thousand borrowers, we study the unlicensed money lending market in Singapore. In this market, borrowers search for lenders, and lenders decide how much money to extort from borrowers. Lenders use acts of harassments to force borrowers into compliance. We observe that different lenders extort different amounts of money from different borrowers. Higher extortion by lenders discourages borrowers from becoming repeat customers. Increased enforcement efforts specifically targeted at reducing the number of lenders in this market will cause an increase in extortion by lenders but will not deter borrowers from becoming repeat customers because borrowers have fewer lenders to choose from.
主讲人简介：许海波，2013年5月毕业于圣路易斯华盛顿大学（Washington University in St. Louis）经济系，经济学博士，现任教于复旦大学经济学院。主要研究领域为博弈论和合约理论，近来着重关注的是不对称信息环境下认知和信誉的形成及对个体的经济激励的影响。其工作论文曾参加过美国经济学学会年会、美国计量学会夏季会议、美国计量学会亚洲会议等一系列学术会议；与王永钦合著的“社会异质性、公私互动与公共品提供的最优所有权安排。”发表于《世界经济》（2010年）。现为博士生开设博弈论、合约理论等课程。
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大陆成人直播
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微观workshop:Extorting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore’s Unlicensed Money Lending Market
发布日期：2017-12-29 10:17 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2017年12月29日（周五）14:00-15:30
地点：北京大学致福轩大教室
主讲人：徐海波 （复旦大学助教授）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Extorting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore’s Unlicensed Money Lending Market
(coauthored with Kaiwen Leong and Huailu Li )摘要：Using a unique dataset that tracked the borrowing behavior of over a thousand borrowers, we study the unlicensed money lending market in Singapore. In this market, borrowers search for lenders, and lenders decide how much money to extort from borrowers. Lenders use acts of harassments to force borrowers into compliance. We observe that different lenders extort different amounts of money from different borrowers. Higher extortion by lenders discourages borrowers from becoming repeat customers. Increased enforcement efforts specifically targeted at reducing the number of lenders in this market will cause an increase in extortion by lenders but will not deter borrowers from becoming repeat customers because borrowers have fewer lenders to choose from.
主讲人简介：许海波，2013年5月毕业于圣路易斯华盛顿大学（Washington University in St. Louis）经济系，经济学博士，现任教于复旦大学经济学院。主要研究领域为博弈论和合约理论，近来着重关注的是不对称信息环境下认知和信誉的形成及对个体的经济激励的影响。其工作论文曾参加过美国经济学学会年会、美国计量学会夏季会议、美国计量学会亚洲会议等一系列学术会议；与王永钦合著的“社会异质性、公私互动与公共品提供的最优所有权安排。”发表于《世界经济》（2010年）。现为博士生开设博弈论、合约理论等课程。
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