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宏观经济学workshop:Optimal CEO Contracting with Moral Hazard and External Shocks
发布日期：2018-05-22 10:31 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
宏观经济学workshop
时间：2018年5月22日（星期二）13：30－15：00
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心致福轩会议室
主讲人：杨有智（上海财经大学）
题目：
Optimal CEO Contracting with Moral Hazard and External Shocks
演讲内容简介：
We study a dynamic principal-agent/shareholders-CEO relationship which is subject, simultaneously, to moral hazard, limited commitment, and stochastic shocks to the agent's external market value. Termination is used as (a) an incentive instrument to punish the agent for bad performance, (b) a cost minimization device to make use of the agent's outside value as an external means for compensation, and (c) as a means for replacing the incumbent agent with a less expensive new one. The optimal contract generates voluntary and involuntary terminations, retentions with a counteroffer, and retentions without a counteroffer. Termination occurs after the agent receives either a sufficient high or, surprisingly, a sufficiently low outside value. We also show that there is a U-shape relationship between the agent's compensation and the probability of involuntary termination - a prediction of the model that can be tested empirically.
主讲人简介：
Youzhi Yang is an Assistant Professor of School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research interests are dynamic contract theory, macroeconomics, the Chinese labor market, and repeated games with private information. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Iowa State University and a B.S. in Economics from Fudan University.
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大陆成人直播
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宏观经济学workshop:Optimal CEO Contracting with Moral Hazard and External Shocks
发布日期：2018-05-22 10:31 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
宏观经济学workshop
时间：2018年5月22日（星期二）13：30－15：00
地点：北大国发院/中国经济研究中心致福轩会议室
主讲人：杨有智（上海财经大学）
题目：
Optimal CEO Contracting with Moral Hazard and External Shocks
演讲内容简介：
We study a dynamic principal-agent/shareholders-CEO relationship which is subject, simultaneously, to moral hazard, limited commitment, and stochastic shocks to the agent's external market value. Termination is used as (a) an incentive instrument to punish the agent for bad performance, (b) a cost minimization device to make use of the agent's outside value as an external means for compensation, and (c) as a means for replacing the incumbent agent with a less expensive new one. The optimal contract generates voluntary and involuntary terminations, retentions with a counteroffer, and retentions without a counteroffer. Termination occurs after the agent receives either a sufficient high or, surprisingly, a sufficiently low outside value. We also show that there is a U-shape relationship between the agent's compensation and the probability of involuntary termination - a prediction of the model that can be tested empirically.
主讲人简介：
Youzhi Yang is an Assistant Professor of School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research interests are dynamic contract theory, macroeconomics, the Chinese labor market, and repeated games with private information. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Iowa State University and a B.S. in Economics from Fudan University.
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