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微观workshop: On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
发布日期：2018-05-17 10:16 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年5月17日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：唐前锋（副教授,上海财经大学经济学院）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
（Co-author with Kang Rong and Yongchao Zhang)
摘要：For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set (TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, independent of other students’ preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS always produces a complete assignment if and only if the associated deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient, or equivalently, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, for any such priority structure, the assignment made by iteratively removing TFS coincides with that of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
主讲人简介：Dr. Qianfeng Tang received his Ph.D. in Economics from The University of Texas at Austin. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained his B.A. Economics (Minor in mathematics) from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His main research interests include Microeconomics Theory, Mechanism Design and Game Theory. He has publiced in top journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Social Choice and Welfare.
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大陆成人直播
-
微观workshop: On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
发布日期：2018-05-17 10:16 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年5月17日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：唐前锋（副教授,上海财经大学经济学院）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems
（Co-author with Kang Rong and Yongchao Zhang)
摘要：For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set (TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, independent of other students’ preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS always produces a complete assignment if and only if the associated deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient, or equivalently, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, for any such priority structure, the assignment made by iteratively removing TFS coincides with that of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
主讲人简介：Dr. Qianfeng Tang received his Ph.D. in Economics from The University of Texas at Austin. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained his B.A. Economics (Minor in mathematics) from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. His main research interests include Microeconomics Theory, Mechanism Design and Game Theory. He has publiced in top journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Social Choice and Welfare.
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