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微观workshop:Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games
发布日期：2018-04-19 01:27 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年4月19日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：赵墨非（助理教授,首经贸大学）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games
摘要：This paper studies a novel setting in game theory: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the opponent's play. We investigate the economics behind such learning behavior in the context of finitely repeated games. We find that learning creates three major impacts on equilibrium patterns and sustainable payoffs. First, it bridges the gap between theories of finitely and infinitely repeated games, in the sense that cooperation can now be sustained in a framework with full rationality and consistent stage-game payoffs. Second, learning facilitates Pareto improvement. Cooperation does not have to be endowed in each player's initial action set, but can be ``taught'' and enforced in equilibrium. Third, when learning is imperfect, the set of sustainable payoffs is surprisingly not continuous: no equilibrium exists when learning is nearly perfect and the repeated games last for sufficiently many periods.
主讲人简介：Dr. Mofei Zhao received his Ph.D. in Economics from the UCLA in 2016. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained her Bachelor of Finance from Tsinghua University in 2010. His main research interests include Economic Theory, Industrial Organization.
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大陆成人直播
-
微观workshop:Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games
发布日期：2018-04-19 01:27 来源：大陆成人直播-成人直播中文
时间：2018年4月19日（周四）13:30-15:00
地点：北京大学万众楼小教室
主讲人：赵墨非（助理教授,首经贸大学）
主持人：汪浩、胡岠
题目：Learning of Actions in Finitely Repeated Games
摘要：This paper studies a novel setting in game theory: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the opponent's play. We investigate the economics behind such learning behavior in the context of finitely repeated games. We find that learning creates three major impacts on equilibrium patterns and sustainable payoffs. First, it bridges the gap between theories of finitely and infinitely repeated games, in the sense that cooperation can now be sustained in a framework with full rationality and consistent stage-game payoffs. Second, learning facilitates Pareto improvement. Cooperation does not have to be endowed in each player's initial action set, but can be ``taught'' and enforced in equilibrium. Third, when learning is imperfect, the set of sustainable payoffs is surprisingly not continuous: no equilibrium exists when learning is nearly perfect and the repeated games last for sufficiently many periods.
主讲人简介：Dr. Mofei Zhao received his Ph.D. in Economics from the UCLA in 2016. Prior to his doctoral study, he obtained her Bachelor of Finance from Tsinghua University in 2010. His main research interests include Economic Theory, Industrial Organization.
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