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微观经济学workshop：Reputation, Relative Performance, and Optimal Degree of Competition
发布日期：2019-04-18 12:00 来源：
时 间：2019年4月18日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303教室
组织人：汪浩 胡涛 吴泽南 胡岠
主讲人：杜创
题 目：Reputation, Relative Performance, and Optimal Degree of Competition
Abstract:
We study how the degree of competition (the number of firms) affects firms’ reputation in experience goods markets, where consumers observe only imperfect signals about firms’ effort/quality choices. Competition facilitates firms in maintaining reputation because consumers have more choices and thus could punish firms more credibly; fierce competition, however, reduces firms’ incentive to produce high-qualityproducts because firms’ profit margins shrink. In uncertain environments, competition also helps reputation-building with better monitoring by eliminating common shocks among firms. By studying the interaction of these three effects, we find that optimal reputation mechanism involves asymmetric market structure and relative performance evaluation, demonstrate the existence of the optimal degree of competition, and obtain a formula to compute it. Our relatively general setup suggests that some conflicting results of existing theoretical literature may be due to the specific assumptions of different models.
Short Bio：
杜创，现任中国社会科学院经济研究所微观经济学研究室主任、研究员，中国社会科学院大学教授、博士生导师，兼中国社会科学院公共政策研究中心副主任。北京大学经济学博士、斯坦福大学访问学者。主要研究方向包括产业组织、互联网经济、中国医疗卫生体制改革等。在《经济研究》、《中国社会科学》、《世界经济》等期刊发表论文数十篇，出版专著1部。主持或参与中央网信办、国家发改委、财政部、人力资源与社会保障部委托政策研究课题多项。
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大陆成人直播
-
微观经济学workshop：Reputation, Relative Performance, and Optimal Degree of Competition
发布日期：2019-04-18 12:00 来源：
时 间：2019年4月18日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303教室
组织人：汪浩 胡涛 吴泽南 胡岠
主讲人：杜创
题 目：Reputation, Relative Performance, and Optimal Degree of Competition
Abstract:
We study how the degree of competition (the number of firms) affects firms’ reputation in experience goods markets, where consumers observe only imperfect signals about firms’ effort/quality choices. Competition facilitates firms in maintaining reputation because consumers have more choices and thus could punish firms more credibly; fierce competition, however, reduces firms’ incentive to produce high-qualityproducts because firms’ profit margins shrink. In uncertain environments, competition also helps reputation-building with better monitoring by eliminating common shocks among firms. By studying the interaction of these three effects, we find that optimal reputation mechanism involves asymmetric market structure and relative performance evaluation, demonstrate the existence of the optimal degree of competition, and obtain a formula to compute it. Our relatively general setup suggests that some conflicting results of existing theoretical literature may be due to the specific assumptions of different models.
Short Bio：
杜创，现任中国社会科学院经济研究所微观经济学研究室主任、研究员，中国社会科学院大学教授、博士生导师，兼中国社会科学院公共政策研究中心副主任。北京大学经济学博士、斯坦福大学访问学者。主要研究方向包括产业组织、互联网经济、中国医疗卫生体制改革等。在《经济研究》、《中国社会科学》、《世界经济》等期刊发表论文数十篇，出版专著1部。主持或参与中央网信办、国家发改委、财政部、人力资源与社会保障部委托政策研究课题多项。
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