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微观理论Workshop: Decentralized Network Bargaining with Endogenous Matching
发布日期：2019-05-16 12:00 来源：
时 间：2019年5月16日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人：Duozhe Li（CUHK）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Decentralized Network Bargaining with Endogenous Matching
摘 要：
We study a decentralized network bargaining model with endogenous matching. In each period, a trading opportunity is randomly bestowed to one player, who can choose to bargain with any neighbor on the network over a joint surplus. When a pair of players reaches an agreement, they are removed from the network. The key question is whether such decentralized transactions always lead to an efficient market outcome. Under a set of symmetry conditions, we show that an efficient Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE henceforth) always exists. The efficiency result is in stark contrast to that of Abreu and Manea (2012). We also find that some networks possess both efficient and inefficient MPEs. Moreover, for networks with non-uniform distribution of trading opportunities, link-specific surpluses, or asymmetric distribution of bargaining power, it is possible that all the MPEs are inefficient.
主讲人介绍：
Duozhe Li is currently an associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He obtained his PhD in Economics from Boston University, BS in Physics and MA in Economics from Fudan University. His primary research interest is in game theory with emphasis on non-cooperative bargaining theory and its applications in microeconomics.
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大陆成人直播
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微观理论Workshop: Decentralized Network Bargaining with Endogenous Matching
发布日期：2019-05-16 12:00 来源：
时 间：2019年5月16日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人：Duozhe Li（CUHK）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Decentralized Network Bargaining with Endogenous Matching
摘 要：
We study a decentralized network bargaining model with endogenous matching. In each period, a trading opportunity is randomly bestowed to one player, who can choose to bargain with any neighbor on the network over a joint surplus. When a pair of players reaches an agreement, they are removed from the network. The key question is whether such decentralized transactions always lead to an efficient market outcome. Under a set of symmetry conditions, we show that an efficient Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE henceforth) always exists. The efficiency result is in stark contrast to that of Abreu and Manea (2012). We also find that some networks possess both efficient and inefficient MPEs. Moreover, for networks with non-uniform distribution of trading opportunities, link-specific surpluses, or asymmetric distribution of bargaining power, it is possible that all the MPEs are inefficient.
主讲人介绍：
Duozhe Li is currently an associate professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He obtained his PhD in Economics from Boston University, BS in Physics and MA in Economics from Fudan University. His primary research interest is in game theory with emphasis on non-cooperative bargaining theory and its applications in microeconomics.
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