大陆成人直播

微观理论工作坊

时间：10月9日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

主讲人：Wei He（Associate Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong）

题目: The Limits of Ambiguous Mechanisms

摘要：

This paper explores the limits of the strategic use of ambiguity in a standard mechanism design setting. We fully characterize the revenue-maximizing ambiguous mechanism without imposing restrictions on the agent side. We also characterize the seller's potential revenue gain from employing an ambiguous mechanism. It is shown that such mechanisms can increase the seller's revenue in general, but full surplus extraction is generically impossible.

主讲人介绍：Wei He is an Associate Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He received his bachelor's degree from Peking University in 2010, PhD in Mathematics from National University of Singapore in 2014, and PhD in Economics from University of Iowa in 2016. His research interests include game theory and mechanism design. He is currently working on projects related to robust mechanism design and designing simple contracts in dynamic markets.