大陆成人直播

时间：10月21日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

主讲人：Lester Chan（Assistant Professor at Southern University of Science and Technology Business School）

题目: Buying Votes to Maximize the Potential

摘要：

A vote buyer simultaneously offers voters personalized bribes asking them to vote for a proposal that is against their interests under general voting rules. Multiple equilibria typically arise: Either all voters or any maximal losing coalition accept their bribes and vote for the proposal. I show that this stylized vote-buying game is a potential game, and therefore a well-justified equilibrium selection criterion, potential maximization, is applicable. Under potential maximization, the buyer’s set of optimal bribes is the aspiration core of the dual simple game, concepts that are well studied in cooperative game theory. For constant-sum weighted voting rules, the buyer optimally bribes all voters with bribes proportional to their number of votes. My analysis provides a non-cooperative foundation for (a modification of) the aspiration core as a power index.

主讲人介绍：Lester Chan is an Assistant Professor at Southern University of Science and Technology Business School. Before that, he was an Assistant Professor in Economics at Xiamen University. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University in 2021. His research interests are microeconomic theory and industrial organization, with a focus on contract theory, business economics, platforms, and potential games. He has published in various leading journals, including solo-authored papers in The RAND Journal of Economics, Management Science, and Theoretical Economics.