大陆成人直播

时间：11月27日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

主讲人：Wanchang Zhang（Assistant Professor of CUHK, Shenzhen）

题目: Robust Auctions for Selling Multiple Goods

摘要：

I study a mechanism design problem for selling multiple goods to multiple bidders under minimal informational assumptions. Specifically, I assume the designer only knows upper bounds on bidders’ values for each good, with no additional distributional in-formation. Adopting a minimax regret approach, I define the expected regret of a mechanism, given a joint distribution over value profiles and an equilibrium, as the difference between the full surplus and the expected revenue. The designer aims to find a minimax regret mechanism——one that minimizes the worst-case expected regret across all possible joint distributions and equilibria. I show that a separate second-price auction with random reserves achieves this objective for general upper bounds. In this mechanism, the designer conducts independent auctions for each good, with each auction being a second-price auction with random reserves.

主讲人介绍：Wanchang Zhang received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, San Diego. He previously earned a Master’s degree in Economics from Kyoto University and a Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Xiamen University. His research focuses on microeconomic theory, particularly mechanism design and in-formation design. His job market paper is currently under revise & resubmit at the American Economic Review.